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NOTES
MODIFICATION OF ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES
No area of law has produced more voluminous records in litigation
than the antitrust field. Because the concepts used to effectuate stan-
dards of antitrust control defy narrow definition, cases often compile
sprawling records for the judge's consideration.' Obviously, the time
consumed and the physical impracticability of reading and evaluating
this mountain of evidence make the job of the court exceedingly difficult.
More important, perhaps, is the fact that the parties, too, are bur-
dened by this litigation. A defendant is put to great expense by the in-
vestigation and trial; its business operations are disrupted, unfavorable
publicity results, and triple-damage actions may follow an adverse deci-
sion. The Antitrust Division, working within a limited budget, also shuns
expensive litigation which may severely circumscribe its other enforce-
ment activities.2
To avoid such litigation, and to speed enforcement of the antitrust
laws, the Department of Justice has employed "consent decrees." The
Antitrust Division first files a complaint with the court or takes it di-
rectly to a suspect business prior to filing.3 Faced with this complaint,
the defendant, if he desires to avoid trial and its attendant unpleasant
consequences, may agree to abandon the suspect conduct. If the Division
is satisfied that antitrust policy is adequately effectuated, this agreement
is then submitted to a federal court for consideration and entry as an
official court decree.4 Thus, the judicial process is reduced to the entry
1. The Alcoa case, for example, produced a 480 volume record, and some 58,000
pages of testimony, weighing 325 pounds. CARR, ALCOA: AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
219-20 (1952).
2. Government litigation expenses have been estimated at $100,000 to $150,000 per
case. HANDLER, A. STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 92 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941).
3. The customary procedure in obtaining a consent decree begins after the filing
of the complaint in a regular antitrust action. At any time prior to entry of a judgment,
a consent decree may be formulated and filed with the court. The current practice of the
Antitrust Division is to submit the complaint to the defendant 'before filing it in court.
Barnes, The Theory and Practice of Anti-trust Enforcement, 59 MD.S.B.A. 72, 77 (1954).
4. The cases differ as to whether the consent decree should be treated entirely the
same way as a regularly-litigated court determination. In many instances the consent
element of the decree is construed in the light of a contract between the Government
and the named defendant. See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F.Supp.
654, 655 (D.Del. 1942); United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693,
703 (1926). Because the court will not allow the public interest to be determined and
perhaps bargained away by the Attorney General, the court possesses a power to modify
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of the decree and the granting of contempt action where the conduct of
the defendant deviates from that specified in the decree.
In the bargaining the defendant may refuse to consent when it be-
lieves it has disobeyed no antitrust commandment, or that the relief
sought by the Government is disproportionate to the alleged violation or
threat of violation and that the court, after litigation, would not be likely
to grant it. However, the threat of suit frequently results in the business
agreeing to abandon the questionable practices.5 The defendant thus
bargains to retain as much of its profit-making position as possible and,
in some instances, to gain express approval of certain dubious activities
in the permissive parts of the decree.6
When, after entry, a decree is challenged, the nature of the decree
creates difficult practical and theoretical problems.! While all decrees
are subject to the inherent power of the court to enforce, interpret, and
modify,8 the court has neither participated in formulating the decree nor
received any formal record of the bargaining between the parties upon
which to base subsequent determinations.5
To be a useful device the decree must have some binding effect;
however, the method by which the decree is reached should justify miti-
gation of a strict application of the res judicata theory.1" Factually the
court that enters the consent decree hears no evidence and thus adjudi-
that cannot be precluded by the parties. A good discussion of the consent decree and its
special position as a civil suit in equity is presented in Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to A Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH L. REv. 1139,
1229-30 (1952).
5. For a discussion of the pattern of decrees in recent years which illustrates the
limited bargaining power of a defendant in a consent decree see Patterson, Consent De-
crees: A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement, 18 U. KAIT. CITY L. REv. 34, 42 (1950).
6. A typical example of a permissive provision is United States v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., where the consent decree operated prospectively to specify that the defendant
was not to be denied the right to the benefits of the patent laws in certain areas. United
States v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1946-47 Trade Cas.) 1 57,
498 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1946). Permissive provisions are of questionable finality
because the Attorney General cannot consent to future violations of the antitrust laws.
The decree cannot determine the lagality of acts not yet performed; however, permissive
provisions do clarify the general understanding of the parties concerning the legality of
present practices. Subsequent claims of illegal activity prior to entry of the decree are
thus avoided.
7. See note 15 infra.
8. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) ; United States v. Radio
Corp. of America, 46 F.Supp. 654, 655 (D.Del. 1942).
9. During a ten year period prior to 1945 approximately two-thirds of the decrees
were entered within three days of the original institution of the proceeding. See Note,
63 -ARv. L. REV. 320, 322n. 13 (1949). However, the court does reserve the right to
determine what is in the "public interest" and, in doing so, require's that the decree
be explained to its satisfaction. See Isenbergh & Rubin, Anti-trust Enforcement Through
Consent Decrees, 53 HARv. L. REv. 386, 408-12 (1940).
10. See text, p. 362 infra.
NOTES
cates nothing in most instances." Considering the growing use of consent
decrees, 2 modification becomes an increasingly vital and complex mat-
ter; so complex, indeed, that the courts have yet to delineate rules to
bring certainty to this area of law. It is with this problem that this
note seeks to do battle.
As grounds for appeal are obviated by the consensual nature of the
decree,' 3 disputes arising after the entry of a consent decree usually con-
cern problems of enforcement, interpretation, or modification. 4 Unless
a hearing is held the court's sole guide in these activities is generally
limited to the content of the decree itself, and, to the extent that there
have been no findings, ambiguities may be difficult to resolve. 5
Enforcement of a decree by contempt proceedings may be easily ef-
fected if the conduct provisions of the decree are specifically drafted.
However, specific provisions, while expediting enforcement, may hinder
11. The decree is officially entered without evidence, hearing, or finding of fact.
A standard provision is used in each decree expressly stating this fact, e.g., "Now, there-
fore, before any testimony has been taken and without trial or adjudication of any
issue of fact or law herein and upon consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby . . .
(ordered, etc.)" United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954
Trade Cas.) ff 67,920, at 70,005 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1954).
12. In a recent address Assistant Attorney General Stanley N. Barnes indicated that
from May 1, 1953 to January 20, 1954, ". . . we disposed of just exactly sixty percent
more cases by termination than during the preceding nine month period, and with a
smaller staff. This amounted to forty-two cases. Twelve were terminated by court
decision, three by dismissal, and twenty-seven by consent or nolo pleas." Barnes, The
Theory and Practice of Anti-Trust Enforcement, 59 MD.S.B.A. 72, 79 (1954).
13. English practice did not allow a consent decree to be set aside by appeal or bill
of review, except for clerical errors. The more liberal United States position undercut
the no-appeal standard by allowing claims for lack of actual consent, fraud in procure-
ment, and lack of federal jurisdiction because of citizenship of the parties. However,
the court seldom, if ever, examines the merits of the cause when it affirms a consent
decree. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928).
14. The court will enter a proposed modification consented to by both parties, if it
does not conflict with the limits imposed by "public interest" as determined by the court.
In one stipulated modification the court made an independent determination in the absence
of a full examination by the Antitrust Division: ". . . It appearing that plaintiff [the
Government] has not made a full examination of all the circumstances with respect to
alleged difficulties in disposing of said theatres, but it appearing to this Court that if the
conditions hereinafter set forth are complied with, competition in Schine towns and the
disposition of theatres required to be disposed of will be facilitated." United' States v.
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1952-53 Trade Cas.) II 67,237, at
67,349 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1952).
15. While a well-written decree could provide the judge with an infallable guide,
frequently ambiguity requires resort to the intention of the parties at the time the decree
was made. In a 1952 case the Supreme Court interpreted a decree concerning separation
of a movie production-distribution company from exhibition company interests. The lower
court interpreted the decree to require divestiture. In reversing the divestiture order
the Supreme Court indicated that the interpretation of the lower court was contrary
to that ordinarily given by "most persons." Howard Hughes v. United States, 342
U.S. 353, 356 (1952), CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1952-53 Trade Cas.) ff 67,213, at 67,268
(U.S. Feb. 4, 1952).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the flexibility necessary for the decree to prove fully effective amidst
changing conditions."6 As most of the provisions are now expressed in
specific terms,17 the Government apparently has decided that certainty,
although it may work a subsequent hardship," outweighs the value of
flexibility. To avoid this rigidity many decrees now contain a provision
allowing special petition to the court for variance of the original decree."
These provisions supply the court with standards by which to judge peti-
tions for change.2" Enforcement, therefore, presents relatively few
problems in actual practice.2
Interpretation involves more difficult issues because the possible
variation of remedies may affect substantial interests of both parties. 22
16. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1950-51
Trade Cas.) 1 62,680 (N.D. Calif. June 26, 1950).
17. Specific decrees, by definition, require express conduct on the part of the
defendant, e.g., divorcement or divestiture in monopoly situations or orders to grant
licenses to prevent patent misuse. The specific order itself may or may not be capable
of solving a given antitrust problem, but is a necessary substitute for the vague standards
used in the Sherman Act if enforcement is to avoid the cumbersome problems of a
litigated decree.
18. In one instance the Government and two of the parties to a consent decree at-
tempted to vacate a decree by showing that the specific relief provided no longer followed
the basic purpose of the decree to promote competition. The defendant who had obtained
patent advantages from the decree objected and successfully retained its competition-
free position in the market. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F.Supp.
654 (D. Del. 1942).
19. A typical decree, ordering a defendant cotton exchange to abandon certain
activities, provided for avoidance of the sanction by motion of the defendant if, at the time
specified, a showing could be made that failure to continue the exchange would be incon-
sistent with the public interest. United States v. Savannah Cotton and Naval Stores
Exchange, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1950-51 Trade Cas.) 11 62,929 (D.Ga. Oct. 18,
1951). See also United States v. Kosher Butchers' Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 67,988,
at 70,209 (S.D. Calif., March 1, 1955).
20. A recent decree provides that the defendant is subject to possible Government
request for further court orders or directions to assure that their sale or distribution
of food does not result in the defendant's obtaining "unlawful competitive advantages,"
even when acting consistently with the specific terms of the consent decree. United States
v. The New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954
Trade Cas.) ff 67,658, at 69,114 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1954). It might be questioned whether,
in some instances, the standard built into the decree is so broad as to prompt extensive
litigation on the matter, which would defeat the original purpose of the consent decree.
A decree may also provide that after two years the defendant may apply to the court
for an exception to the provisions of the decree. In one case the sanction was to terminate
if, upon a hearing, the court determines that a proposed acquisition will not "tend to deter
or restrict competition in the production, sale or distribution of coarse aggregates . . ."
in the New York area. The craftsmanship of this decree illustrates how the parties
can allow for the contingent termination of a sanction in accordance with the basic
purpose, by placing the burden upon the defendant to establish the status of competition
when a change is sought. United States v. New York Trap Rock Corp., CCH TRADE
REG REP. (1950-51 Trade Cas.) 1 62,838, at 64,472 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1951).
21. Even the clear and specific enforcement of consent decrees can raise problems
of investigation and proof, but these are not the concern of this note.
22. Two recent cases, involving interpretations effecting a divestiture of valuable
property interests by lower courts, were reversed by the Supreme Court. United States
NOTES
The court must look to relatively barren decrees in determining what the
original agreement between the parties contemplated. If the interpreta-
tion of the Government prevails, the defendant may be divested of valu-
able property;2" if the Government loses, it is bound by the adverse inter-
pretation and is precluded from further antitrust enforcement on this
ground.24 In this contest victory by the defendant does not permanently
subvert the public interest, for the Government can always bring subse-
quent actions for new violations.2" Thus, when the court "interprets" a
consent decree, it may effectively "modify" the decree; something to
which at least one of the parties never agreed has now been written into,
or something upon which a consenting party relied has been written out
of, the decree.26 Without considering further the complex problem of
interpretation it should be noted that caution has been exercised to pre-
vent avoidance of judicial safeguards now applicable to modification
actions under the guise of "interpretations."2
v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 123 F.Supp. 653 (1954), reversed-U.S.--(1955); Howard
Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952). The opposing party in these interpreta-
tion situations usually argues that any interpretation other than its own involves
remedies unalterably inconsistent with those to which itoriginally consented.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 123 F.Supp. 653 (1954).
24. One court has found a request for modification requiring a return to competitive
conditions prior to the entry of the decree ". . . repugnant to the agreement approved
by the court and embodied in the decree, which has become binding upon all parties,
and upon which . . . [the defendant] has, in the exercise of good faith, been entitled
to rely." United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 703 (1927). Also,
although the construction requested by the Government was more nearly in line with the
enforcement of the antitrust laws, the court denied the motion because the court found
the language of the decree unambiguous- United States v. Radio Corp. of America,
CCH TRADE REc. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67,704 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 1954).
25. Although the court is the determining body as to the public interest, where
the Government clearly shows that the consent decree no longer serves the public interest,
the court may refuse to modify the decree on grounds of upholding a bargain made by
the Government. This seems inconsistent. In any conflict between public interest and
private interest, the private interest is usually subordinated. Yet when, in seeking to
nullify a decree, the Government argues that the public interest, i.e., achieving conform-
ance with the antitrust laws, has not been met, the courts will uphold a private right.
Cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.)
ff 67,704 (D.Del. Jan. 11, 1954). Perhaps the court considers the public interest in
upholding consent decrees more important than the public interest in absolute conform-
ance with the antitrust dictates. To allow the Antitrust Division to run rough-shod over
the private rights for which a defendant bargained would discourage future defendants
from entering into consent decrees.
26. The rights of the parties to rely upon the plain meaning of the decree is
usually referred to in contract terms. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, CCH
TRADE RG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67,704, at 69,265 (D.Del. Jan. 11, 1954). See
also United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 703 (1927).
27. The recent Hughes case decided by the Supreme Court concerned divestiture of
a substantial property right. The dispute began with an appeal of a divestiture order
which the defendant challenged as a modification of the decree to which he never
consented. The court indicated that a divestiture can be the subject of a modification
change, but not where done merely as an interpretation. 'We entertain no doubt concern-
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Expressing the limits of modification is merely one way of defining
the extent of finality. In general the doctrine of res judicata applies to
judicial decrees for the purpose of putting to rest matters in issue.28
While antitrust consent decrees are primarily concerned only with the
remedy, they do include a broad statement of a cause of action, e.g., Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 20 and expressly deny trial or adjudica-
tion of any issue of fact or law.3" Yet, the decree, if considered as a
bar, would conclude the parties on all matters that could have been litigated
under the broad cause of action specified in the decree.3 No such appli-
cation of the res judicata rule has been made; only matters actually
expressed in the decree are concluded. 2 However, while application of
the res judicata theory has been limited, the courts have achieved finality
by fiat, i.e., by refusing to consider whether parts of the decree could
have been opposed with success.3 The difficulty facing the court is that
the decree is of no practical value to the parties unless final to some
extent."
ing the District Court's power to require a sale of Hughes' stock after a proper hearing."
Howard Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 357 (1952).
28. "The traditional doctrine of res judicata as applied in the judicial system
is inexorable in making a judgment binding so as to shut off further inquiry no matter
how clear the mistake of fact or how obvious the misunderstanding of law or how
unfortunate the choice of policy or how unjust the practical consequences or how inade-
quate the evidence in the record or how poorly prepared the briefs and arguments."
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 171, p. 564 (1951).
29. Where a judgment is rendered it is a bar to not only what was litigated but
precludes action upon any part of the cause that could have been litigated in the original
action. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 62 (1942).
30. The standard provision states: ". . . [the defendant] having appeared and
filed its answer to such complaint denying the substantive allegations thereof, and
plaintiff and said defendant having severally consented to the making and entry of this
Final judgment without trial or adjudication of fact or law herein and without admission
in respect to any issue. . . ." See note 10 supra.
31. Collateral estoppel normally would prevent the subsequent introduction of mat-
ters basic in the determination of the previous finding. However, the consent decree
requires no finding of fact; it expressly denies any trial or adjudication of any issue of
fact or law. See note 10 supra.
32. ". . . [B]ut any such practice, unmentioned or specifically excluded from an
injunction, unless affirmatively sanctioned by other terms of the decree, bears the same
relation to the antitrust laws as it did before the decree was entered." Department of
Justice release, Dec. 16, 1940, 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) 1 8241.65, at 16,705.
33. Cf. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
34. The consent decree arose as a bargain between the parties, implicitly sanctioned
by the court. The outlines of this bargain are delineated by the allegations of the com-
plaint, which in general language, charge a violation, and by the denials contained in the
answer, if any. But the essence of the bargain is two-fold: (1) an agreement that the
isues so made are not resolved and are not to be resolved subsequently and (2) an agree-
ment that the defendant will be required to adhere to a certain course of conduct. To
allow either of the parties without the consent of the other to ignore the decree would
then not only deprive it of its efficacy but would be inequitable. Hence by judicial fiat
the decree stands until modified, and the doctrines of modification of their own force
define the extent of finality.
NOTES
Rules of modification serve to mitigate finality where changed cir-
cumstances have rendered a consent degree an instrument of wrong..5
The usual decree contains a standard provision reserving jurisdiction of
the court to modify,3" although a court 6f equity normally has inherent
power to modify a prospective decree where successful application is con-
tingent upon changing circumstances." However, the finality of the
decree is seriously limited if, while forbidding direct attack, the courts
allow liberal modification. 8
In 1932 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Swift & Co., ruled
against liberal modification. 9 The Swift test required that the party
seeking modification prove to the court's satisfaction (1) that market
conditions or other circumstances essential to the decree have changed
from those existing at the time the decree was entered, and (2) that
these changed conditions now impose a grievous wrong upon one of the
parties. 0
In contested applications for modification, the court has required
strict compliance with the "change of circumstances" rule to effect a
policy against review. 1 Application has been made not only to businesses
wishing to escape control of the decree,4" but also to the Antitrust Divi-
sion, which may wish to abandon a condition that no longer serves the
dictates of the antitrust laws."3 In 1942, however, the Supreme Court
deviated from this policy against liberal modification.44
The Antitrust Division, prior to World War II, had obtained con-
sent decrees from both Chrysler and Ford, forbidding their affiliation
with finance companies.45 The decrees contained provisions contingent
upon the Government imposing similar restrictions upon General Motors
35. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
36. See note 8 supra.
37. "Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this
Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for such further orders and directions
as may be necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Final
Judgment or for the modification or termination of any of the provisions thereof, and
for the enforcement of compliance therewith and punishment of violations thereof."
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas). ff 67,920,
at 70,010 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1954).
38. See note 13 supra.
39. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
40. Id. at 119.
41. After the Swift case there was a ten year period during which no case raised
the issue. See Note, 63 HARV. L. Ray. 320, 322n. 17 (1949).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F.Supp. 654 (D.Del.
1942).
44. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942).
45. United States v. Chrysler Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1940-43 Trade Cas.)
f1 56, 106 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 15, 1938) ; United States v. Ford Motor Co., CCH TRADE REG.
REP. (-ed.) f1 52,171 (N.D. Ind. 1938).
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by January 1, 1941. When the Government could not complete the case
against General Motors before the termination date, the Antitrust Divi-
sion sought to modify the decree by extending the date.46 The Supreme
Court, in Chrysler Corp. v. United States, upheld the granting of exten-
sions and announced a more liberal modification doctrine. 7 Any provi-
sion in the consent decree not "of the essence" was subject to change so
long as the "basic purpose" of the decree was not thwarted.48 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter dissented, arguing that the Government had achieved modi-
fication of an express condition without proving that circumstances
justified such a change. 9
As a result of the Chrysler decision the termination dates of both the
Chrysler and Ford decrees were extended until 1948."° When these de-
crees expired, the Government again sought an extension of time, although
General Motors was now utilizing its financing agency. In United States
v. Ford the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, overruled
an extension granted by a lower court and held that the Government had
failed to show good cause why a court of equity should grant relief con-
trary to the express provisions of a decree "well understood and carefully
formulated."'"
The Ford decision neither expressly reiterated the Swift test nor
expressly overruled the Chrysler doctrine. The rationale appears to be
that the change of circumstances rule still applies whenever modification
concerns matters "of the essence" in the decree.52 This requires the party
seeking modification to show grievous wrong wrought by change in cir-
cumstances when dealing with an essential provision. But, in modifica-
46. A modification of the decree, granted December 21, 1940, by the United States
District court for the Northern District of Indiana, is unreported. It was modified to
extend the date of termination to Jan. 1, 1943. CCH TRADE IaG. REP. (1940-43 Trade
Cas.) 1 56,190 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 1942). The original extension was dismissed for
want of a quorum of the court. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 314 U.S. 583 (1941).
47. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942).
48. Id. at 562. The test used -by the court was "whether the change [sought] served
to effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of the original decree."
49. Id. at 570.
50. After observing the Chrysler decision, Ford consented to extensions of time
until 1948.
51. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 322 (1948). Apparently the
decree was not "well understood" by the lower court. The court further ruled that to
extend the decree would only "perpetuate inequality." Ibid.
52. In 1948 the circumstances existing to "extenuate" the importance of the termi-
nation date ten years before were no longer compelling because of the resumption of
full-scale competition. Also, implying that non-essential elements of a decree might
still be subject to modification, the court ruled that in this instance the defendant did
not have to show a harm because of the extension. Thus, the termination date appears
to be considered as "of the essence," and the Government failed because it could show
neither change of circumstances nor grevious harm. Id. at 321, 322.
NOTES
tions not "of the essence," the burden shifts to the party defending the
original decree to show either that the questioned provision is essential
to effect the purpose of the decree5" or that, while it is not "of the
essence," modification will produce substantial harm.5 This raises seri-
ous drafting problems for the parties, as a matter "of the essence" when
the decree is entered may become "not of the essence" by changing cir-
cumstances.55 Thus in a contested modification the Swift rule against
liberal modification still applies except when the provision in controversy
is not of the essence. What will be termed not of the essence is not clear;
but the exception is not to be allowed where it would cause hardship to
the defendant.
To avoid the Swift rule, 6 some decrees expressly provide for modi-
fication without a showing of change of circumstances subsequent to the
entry of the decree."r To the extent provided, the original decree is not
final and allows a specified amount of flexibility.5" The court may be
further aided by the inclusion in the decree of a policy statement by which
any proposed modification can be judged.5" To protect the decree from
prompting extended litigation, standards as sweepingly illusive as "com-
53. Ibid.
54. The Chrysler decree expressly provided that, in the event the Government did
not impose an identical restriction upon General Motors, the defendant had the right to
apply for approval of a plan of affiliation. The proof required to abrogate the decree
and get affiliation plans approved was a showing of harm resulting from any inconsistent
treatment of General Motors and Chrysler. However, the court interpreted the time
limit as a protective device merely to insure expedient litigation of the case by the
Government, and by interpretation shifted the burden to the defendant opposed to
modification to show that modification would cause a competitive disadvantage to occur.
Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 563 (1942).
55. In the Ford case the extension of the termination dates during World War II
was considered as not of the essence. After the war when car sales resumed the term
immediately became of the essence. The Ford Company was not required to sustain
the burden of proof; the majority opinion clearly places the burden of proof upon the
Government and states that the burden was not sustained. Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 335 U.S. 303, 322 (1948). Determining precisely what the phrase "of the
essence" means at any one time is obviously difficult.
56. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
57. United States v. Kosher Butchers' Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 67,988 (S.D.
Calif. Mar. 1, 1955); United States v. Minute Maid Corp., CCH TRADE REG. RE'.
1 68,131 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 1955); United States v. Allied Florists Ass'n., CCH TRADE
REG. REP. (1952-53 Trade Cas.) 67,433 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 1953); United States v.
Decca Records, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1952-53 Trade Cas.) 1 67,402 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 10, 1952).
58. The entire decree is seldom declared subject to alteration without showing
change of circumstances; the change of circumstances exclusion is usually limited to only
one section of the decree. See e.g., United States v. Decca Records, Inc., rupra note 57,
at 68,057.
59. See United States v. Continental Can Co., CCH T-ADE REG. REP. (1950-51
Trade Cas.) ff 62,680, at 63,980 (N.D. Calif. June 26, 1950). Cf. note 20 supra.
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petition" or "monopoly" must be avoided in the drafting of the policy
section."O
The provisions now employed allowing liberal modification may,
where there is a hearing, work an unexpected result.6' The exemption
of consent decree evidence from use in treble-damage actions does not
apply to those instances where there has been a hearing with findings of
fact.62 Some liberal modification provisions require a hearing on evi-
dence of conduct occurring before and after the date of the consent decree
without any bar or estoppel arising by virtue of the decree.6" While the
provision determines the limits of finality of the decree, it may expose
the defendant with unclean hands to substantial pressure not to seek or
oppose modification.64
The evolution of the consent decree shows promise that it may cor-
rect some of its own inherent failings. The dangers of an involuntary
loss of rights and property are minimized by the court's unwillingness to
allow modification under the guise of interpretation. The likelihood that
some technicality written into the decree may frustrate its primary pur-
pose has been minimized by the Chrysler decision. And the position of
the judge is enhanced by the incorporation of policy provisions to guide
prospective changes.
60. Wtiere the decree uses such vague terms as "proper showing" very little is
settled concerning the limits of proof required to effect a change. See United States v.
Allied Florists Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1952-53 Trade Cas.) f1 67,433, at 68,170
(N.D. II1. Feb. 13, 1953).
61. Provisions for special petitions to allow the defendant to abate some of the
directives in the decree, or to allow the Government to obtain further relief, specify that
records of "all proceedings .. .prior to the entry of this judgment . . ." become a part
of the record. United States v. Continental Can Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1950-51
Trade Cas.) 1 62,680, at 63,985 (N.D. Calif. June 26, 1950). See also United States v.
Kosher Butchers' Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. REP. f[ 67,988 (S.D. Calif. Mar. 1, 1955).
62. Section 5 of the Clayton Act provides that a judgment or decree entered under
a litigated proceeding by the Government shall become prima facie evidence in a private
action for treble damages against the defendant, unless the decree is a consent decree
entered before any testimony has been taken. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
16 (1945). Where testimony is taken subsequently in a modification hearing, the con-
sent decree may lose its immunity under § 5. Apparently this question has never been
raised.
63. One decree provides that the record prior to entry of the decree is to be
considered by the court together with the additional evidence to support or oppose the
decree ". . . including the facts and circumstances arising before or subsequent to the
date of this judgment, and without any bar or estoppel arising by reason of the entry of
this judgment." United States v. Kosher Butchers' Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 67,988,
at 70,209 (S.D.Cal. Mar. 1, 1955).
64. Where a defendant may have succeeded in achieving a favorable decree, it
would be unlikely that there would be an attempt to modify except under extreme
circumstances. Proper use of this threat to abandon the decree and force an open litigation
might prevent a party from accepting the parts of the decree that are favorable and then
harrassing the opposition over unfavorable parts. Depending upon the quality of the
evidence existing in the record prior to entry of the decree the Government may be
gaining a powerful weapon to force compliance with the decree.
